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This is a wrongful death action brought against the State of Idaho and its
Department of Fish & Game (collectively "Fish & Game") pursuant to the Idaho
Tort Claims Act; plaintiffs' son was killed in a helicopter accident caused by the
negligent conduct of a Fish & Game employee. The other appeal concerns merits
issues; this appeal is limited to whether the district court had the authority to assess
fees and costs against Fish & Game.
Proceedings Below

K..rinitt adopts and incorporates by reference the description of the proceeding
below from his opening brief in the consolidated appeal. Fish & Game's description
goes too far in supposing that the entry of summary judgment in July 2014 vacates the
already passed deadlines in the scheduling order - certainly there is no language in the
district court's 2014 summary judgment ruling, consequent judgment, or this Court's

2015 opinion from which this can be derived.
}._RGU1v1ENT
This appeal is much more limited in scope than the other appeal with which it
has been consolidated. Here, the sole issue is whether the district court abused its
1

in awarding costs and fees to Krinitt as a consequence of

&
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costs

and fees when motions are filed untimely. Instead, it argues that its motion for
summary judgment, filed years into the case, was not untimelv. It offers essentiallv
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two bases for this contention: (1) that the court-ordered deadline for filing motions
for summary judgment had been vacated, retroactively, by this Court; and (2) that
because statutory employer immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, it can
be raised at any time.

I.

Standard of Review

Fish & Game has correctly stated the standard of review here: it bears the
heavy burden of shO\ving that the district court, which openly discussed its exercise of
discretion in making the award, abused that discretion in finding that the equities
required an award of costs and fees. F&G Br. at 5 (citing Sun Vallry Shopping Ctr. v.

Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991), and Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658 (1982)).
II.

The 2013 Scheduling Order was not Vacated

This district court entered a scheduling order in February 2013. Neither party
appealed the order, either when it was entered or during the earlier appeal of this case,
or, for that matter, now. This Court was not asked to pass upon any past provisions

2

on

past

effect

a modification
not

was

Based on no text of any order of any court, including this Court, Fish & Game
contends that appellate review automatically vacates all prior orders entered by the
district court, not only the ruling that has been appealed and vacated, but with respect
to other orders e.g., setting past deadlines as well. It cites no authority for this
extraordinary proposition. The district court understood that a remand from this
Court gives rise to the need for (and it in fact decreed) a new trial date 1 - the prior
date having passed while the appeal was pending - but no provision of the rules, nor
any authority Fish & Game can point to, should have lead the district court to
conclude that all its prior orders, including those that had not been appealed or passed
upon by this Court, were also vacated.
The district court nonetheless allowed Fish & Game to file its motion out of
time. Whether this was error is the subject of the other case in this consolidated
appeal. Here, Fish & Game has the burden of showing that the district court erred in

Obviously, also, the parties would need new deadlines for submitting jury instructions, exhibit lists,
and other items that are resolved at the final pretrial conference. The conclusion of expert discovery
- that is, depositions of experts whose reports had already been filed - was subject to an informal
understanding of counsel, which both parties were prepared to honor. Completion of work that
would have followed disposition of the 2014 summary judgment motion, had it been denied, has
nothing to do with whether the case resets completely to its outset, with all orders vacated, as an
incident of appellate remand.
1
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Statutory Employer Immunity 1s an Affirmative Defense, and is not a
Question of Subject 1\!latter Jurisdiction
On this issue, the Court could not have been clearer in its holding in Ftthriman
v. State, 143 Idaho 800 (2007): statutory employer immunity is an affirmative defense.

Id. at 803. The Court explicitly limited the time during which this defense could be
raised, id. at 804, which it has never done, as a matter of law, with respect to subject
matter jurisdiction. 2 Nothing about the holding in Ftthriman suggests, even remotely,
that this affirmative defense is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Cases from this Court concerning statutory employer immunity are, to a one,
reviews of the grant of a summary judgment motion. See Ewing v. DOT, 147 Idaho

305 (2009); Bia/av. Starr, 146 Idaho 847 (2009); Cordova v. Bonneville 6 Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 93, 144 Idaho 637 (2007); Kellar v. Cassia Cottnry, 142 Idaho 346 (2005); Gonzalez v.
Lamb Westan Inc., 142 Idaho 120 (2005); Venters v. Sorreato Det., Inc., 141 Idaho 245

(2005); Robinson v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207 (2003); Lines v. Idaho Forest Indtts.,

The district court considered the interesting hypothetical question whether it could set a date for
motions raising subject matter jurisdiction. Tr. at 30-31. Having reflected on the issue, Krinitt
would suggest that the proper answer is as follows: in the interest of having cases proceed in an
orderly fashion, the district court can set a deadline for such motions, with the understanding that
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Where there is an untimely motion, the award of costs
and fees this district court might well be the proper remedy. Rule 8 may not detail the consequences
for filing out of time, see Guzman v. Perry, 155 Idaho 928, 935 (2014), but, as this case illustrates, Rule
16 provides the district court with specific tools, even when a contention cannot be waived by late
assertion.
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(1994); Rhodes v.
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987).

a single

matter
consequently not an abuse of discretion for the district court to take this Court at its
word, and find that statutory immunity was an affirmative defense that had to be
raised in a timely fashion, just like other affirmative defenses. It was correct in its
conclusion that Fish & Game's motion was not timely.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and those presented in its opening brief in the
consolidated case, Krinitt requests that the judgment of the district court be reversed,
that the case be remanded to the district court with instructions to deny Fish &
Game's motion for summary judgment, and to set the matter for trial. In the
alternative, if the Court is not persuaded to overturn the summary judgment, I<rinitt
requests that the district court's decision to award costs and fees be affirmed.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2017.
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